Latvia has always claimed its accession
to the Soviet Union as illegal. Thus, after regaining independence in 1991, it
announced itself to be the successor of the first Republic of
Latvia proclaimed in 1918. All the three Baltic countries did not proclaim
their independence as new states, but resurrected and reconfirmed their former
statehood[1].
This took place in accordance with the fact that the incorporation of Baltic
States by the USSR was generally not recognized internationally.
Latvia
consequently restored its pre-war Constitution, but at the same time opted for
a new Citizenship Law. There was an intensive debate on the issue, concluded
with the decision to introduce quite an exclusive policy, according to which
automatic citizenship was granted to all those who had had the Latvian citizenship before the
Soviet occupation in June 1940 and their descendants. At least 27% of the
Latvian population were disenfranchised[2]. This led
many authors to claim that instead of a democracy, Latvia was becoming an
ethnocracy[3].
The policy was not, however, based on the ethnic affiliation but rather blood
descent, and it was a legal consequence of restoring the pre-war statehood and
its citizenry. In fact, some 30,000 to 40,000 ethnic Latvians who were not citizens did
not obtain citizenship, while a total of 278,087 ethnic Russians, or 38.5% of
all Russians in Latvia, were granted automatic citizenship[4].
The argument of
renewing pre-war policies loses its validity if we take into account that in August 1919, Latvian citizenship was
granted to all persons living permanently on Latvian territory before World War
I[5]
(inclusive citizenship policy). During the first Republic of Latvia, however,
the conditions in terms of minority populations were very different. The
minorities were not only smaller in number, but also much better integrated and
loyal to the new state. Even though the territory of the present-day Republic
of Latvia had always been inhabited by various ethnic groups – not only
Latvians, but also a Finno-Ugric people – the Livs, Germans (starting in the
13th century), Jews and Poles (16th century), Belarusians and Russian
old-believers (17th century) and orthodox Russians (18th century), the first
Republic of Latvia, proclaimed on November 18, 1918, was clearly a nation-based
state with Latvians constituting absolute majority (72.76%) and a Russian
minority amounting to less than 10% of the population[6].
During – and as a result of – World War
II, dramatic ethnographic changes took place. On June 16, 1940, the USSR issued
an ultimatum to Latvia demanding entry of army units and removal of the
authoritarian government. The ultimatum was accepted on the same day, starting
the period of the first Soviet occupation of Latvia. But the “exodus of the
Baltic Germans” had begun even earlier, in 1939. By spring 1940, “about 51,000
Germans left Latvia, mostly in German ships”; ca. 10,000 Germans remained. The
second wave of German emigration took place in the first months of 1940, “and
only about 1,500 Baltic Germans remained in Latvia”[7].
On July 21, the “People’s Parliament”
elected in mock elections featuring a single list of candidates was
established, and its first act was to adopt an illegal declaration of accepting
annexation and incorporation by the USSR[8]. A common
feature of this “annexation and incorporation” of various nation states by the
USSR in 1940-1941 was the operation of mass deportations. In June 1941, such an
operation was launched in Western Ukraine, Moldavia, Estonia, Latvia (15,000
deportees), Lithuania and Western Belarus. The deportations were aimed at
“anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous elements (…), members of various
nationalistic parties, police members, gendarmes, land proprietors,
industrialists, high officials, officers and criminals involved in anti-Soviet
activities and employed by foreign intelligence services for spying”[9].
With most Germans and many Latvians gone
– and with the Jewish and Roma populations eradicated almost completely – the
Russian migration into Latvia (as into all other annexed countries) began, “and
soon attained considerable proportions. About 400,000 Russians and 100,000
other immigrants arrived in Latvia between 1945 and 1959. The peak period is
believed to be 1947-9”[11].
World War II had a catastrophic effect
on the ethnography of Latvia. The repatriation of Germans and exterminations of
Jews eradicated the two ethnic groups that had played an important role in
Latvia’s economy and culture before the war. Due to war casualties, repressions
and migrations, the number of ethnic Latvians could have dropped by 267,000
persons[12];
but the absolute population of Latvia increased due to the above-mentioned
Russian immigration. It must also be highlighted that World War II, due to the
massive loss of Latvian men at reproductive age, not only resulted in immediate
decrease in the number of ethnic Latvians, but also affected their natural
growth in following decades.
The following table summarizes the changes
in population of various ethnic groups in Latvia between 1920 and 2000:
Table 1
Latvians
|
Russians
|
Belarusians
|
Ukrainians
|
Jews
|
Germans
|
|
1920
|
72.76%
|
7.82%
|
4.74%
|
-
|
4.99%
|
3.64%
|
1935
|
75.50%
|
10.59%
|
1.38%
|
0.10%
|
4.79%
|
3.19%
|
1943
|
81.90%
|
9.50%
|
2.70%
|
0.60%
|
-
|
-
|
1959
|
62.00%
|
26.50%
|
2.90%
|
1.40%
|
1.70%
|
-
|
1970
|
56.70%
|
29.80%
|
4.00%
|
2.20%
|
1.50%
|
-
|
1979
|
53.70%
|
32.90%
|
4.40%
|
2.60%
|
1.10%
|
-
|
1989
|
52.04%
|
33.90%
|
4.40%
|
3.40%
|
0.80%
|
-
|
1996
|
56.50%
|
30.40%
|
4.40%
|
2.80%
|
0.60%
|
0.20%
|
2000
|
57.58%
|
29.61%
|
4.10%
|
2.68%
|
0.44%
|
0.15%
|
Worth noting are
especially the following changes:
- drastic decrease of the number of Latvians between
1943 and 1959, due to war casualties,deportations and Russian immigration;
-
drastic increase of the number of Russians between
1943 and 1959;
-
the decrease in Belarusian population between 1920 and
1935 (many Belarusians stated Russian
or Polish identity in the 1935 census[13]), and the
increase between 1959 and 1970 due to immigration;
-
drastic decrease of the number of Jews and Germans
after 1943; let us be reminded that Jewish and German historical minorities
were well integrated, well educated and played an important role in building
the first Latvian state.
Jubulis[14] summarizes the population changes in Latvia and Riga between 1935 and 1989 in absolute numbers:
1935-1989: LATVIA RĪGA
Latvians
-79,278 +89,203
Russians
+737,249 +402,209
Belarusians
+92,899 +42,858
Ukrainians
+90,257 +38,955
Jews
-70,473 -24,860
Germans
-58,333 -37,469
total
(includes ‘others’) +761,194 +525,392
The next table
shows the change in proportion of ethnic Latvians in the biggest Latvian
cities; the last column presents the proportion of Russian speakers in the
respective cities after 1989:
Table 2
after: Etnosituācija Latvijā
1992: 4
|
after: Jubulis 2001: 159
|
|||||
1935
|
1959
|
1970
|
1979
|
1989
|
Russian speakers in 1989
|
|
Rīga
Daugavpils
Liepāja
Jelgava
Jūrmala
Ventspils
Rēzekne
Jēkabpils
Valmiera
Ogre
|
63.0%
33.6%
68.0%
78.9%
86.6%
83.5%
44.0%
65.8%
95.0%
83.4%
|
44.6%
13.2%
52.3%
59.7%
50.7%
60.4%
30.5%
50.4%
79.6%
60.0%
|
40.9%
14.4%
47.5%
56.4%
46.8%
55.0%
34.7%
50.4%
75.2%
63.1%
|
38.3%
12.6%
41.9%
52.1%
48.2%
47.5%
35.0%
50.0%
74.0%
61.4%
|
36.5%
13.0%
38.8%
49.7%
44.2%
43.0%
37.3%
48.4%
74.6%
60.7%
|
56.9%
70.5%
55.5%
44.6%
50.4%
51.6%
58.6%
45.7%
no data
no data
|
Sovietisation and Russification affected
especially the ethnic minorities: in 1989 only 22.5% Jews, 27.1% Poles, 32.2%
Belarusians, 34% Germans, 45.9% Ukrainians, 50.3% Estonians and 63.9%
Lithuanians living in Latvia knew their nation’s mother tongue, and only 22.8%
Poles, 27% Jews, 28.7% Estonians and 40.3% Lithuanians could communicate also
in Latvian[15].
The fact that most non-Russian ethnic minorities in the Latvian SSR assumed a
de-nationalized Soviet identity with Russian as a lingua franca has led to the creation of a two-community society in
the newly restored Latvia.
A huge Russian (or Russian-speaking)
minority today is not a problem limited to Latvia or even the Baltic states. 21
million Russians were residing in the fourteen non-Russian republics of the
Soviet Union in the 1970s (at the end of the 20th century the Russian Diaspora
in post-Soviet countries amounted to 25 million people[16]). Russian
immigration embraced all republics to varying degrees, which has led the
successor state of the Soviet Union – the Russian Federation – to assume the
role of an “external homeland” and protector of Russians (understood as
citizens of Russia, ethnic Russians, or even simply Russian-speakers) in the
“near abroad” – non-Russian post-Soviet states – perceived as one of the most
important directions in Russian foreign politics.
The developments outlined above have
resulted in the creation of a triadic relationship between the national (ethnic[17])
minority, the (nationalizing) state in which it lives, and the external
homeland[18].
There are many factors that affect this relationship, which as it is appears
complicated enough. First, all three stakeholders experienced a major change of
status in the 1990s, resulting in a crisis of identity: the nationalizing state
of Latvia and Latvians are in the process of “healing” their national identity[19],
the external homeland of Russia is reconstructing its own identity after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the minority of ethnic Russians and ca. 100
other post-Soviet nationalities[20]
– among which a true, de-nationalized Soviet citizen (“Homo Sovieticus”) may
undoubtedly still be found – is trapped in the middle, not yet Latvian, but not
really Russian either[21].
Second, the Latvian state positions itself as a protector of Latvian national
values, incl. the Latvian language, which may be seen as taking precedence over
the rights of minorities. Third, the external homeland claims the right to
protect its Diaspora (however broadly defined) and, by extension, to interfere
in internal matters of the new state. But actually it is not so much interested
in bringing its “compatriots” back home or having them fully integrated in the
new country, as both outcomes would make its “right” to interfere lose ground. In
such a context, the minority group may act in choosing between available
strategies – exit, voice, loyalty (according to Jubulis 2001) or informal
networks, exit, voice (according to Commercio 2010). As a matter of fact, the
Russian-speaking group in Latvia appears rather passive, which may be considered
a legacy of Communist (lack of) political culture reinforced by the
undertakings of both the nationalizing state and the external homeland. The
dominant discourse of the former may have been internalized by representatives
of the minorities by now, making them believe that their identities are
‘problematic’ and that it is fair they have fewer rights[22].
The discourse of the latter, as well as of local leaders positioning themselves
as defenders of non-citizens’ rights, may have resulted in an average non-citizen waiting for laws to
change rather than taking an individual effort of applying for citizenship or
learning Latvian[23].
*part of the project “Discourse-historical analysis of the press discourse on ethnic conflict in Latvia” carried out at the Herder Institute in Marburg, Germany, in January-February 2013. For full bibliography, see here.
*part of the project “Discourse-historical analysis of the press discourse on ethnic conflict in Latvia” carried out at the Herder Institute in Marburg, Germany, in January-February 2013. For full bibliography, see here.
[1] Kolstoe 1995: 111.
[2] Kuklys 2008: 52.
[3] “Ethnocentric nation-building” (Kolstoe 2000: 116); “ethnic
democracy with an exclusion policy” (Linz & Stephan 1996: 429ff). See also
e.g. Smith, Aasland & Mole 1996, Pabriks 1999.
[4] Jubulis 2001: 25.
[5] Dribins 2001: 311.
[6] Dribins (ed.) 1996: 6, 12. As a side note, it may be mentioned that
in 1992, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumière,
argued that Latvia’s position (i.e., the exclusive citizenship law) “was understandable
since the Russian minority did not fit the ‘traditional’ concept of a national
minority”, as it was above 10% (Galbreath 2005: 277).
[7] Bleiere et al. 2006: 218.
[8] Blūzma, Jundzis, Riekstiņš et al. 2009.
[9] Polian 2004: 120.
[10] Ābols 2003: 232-233.
[11] Kolstoe 1995: 47.
[12] Bleiere et al. 2006: 418.
[13] Dribins 2001: 308.
[14] Jubulis 2001: 47-48.
[15] Dribins 2001: 318.
[16] Jubulis 2001.
[17] As M. Lindqvist claims, “national identity is transformed,
semantically, into an ethnic identity when the bearer moves from a dominant
position to that of a minority, that is, from his or her “own” land to a
“foreign” one” (2003: 8).
[19] Silova 2006: 86.
[20] Commercio 2010: 30.
[21] Cf. B. Lindqvist 2003: 333.
[22] Cf. Gelber 2002: 84 – theory originally developed with regard to
racist hate speech-acts, and Gould 2010: “minorities (…) internalise the
stereotypes and prejudices employed in connection with their own groups; they
also internalise an image of themselves as problematic; that is to say, as
foreign or as the cause of social problems and a threat to social cohesion” (p.
17).
[23] Apine & Volkovs 2007: 90.
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