Ethnic policy of the USSR

Polian (2004) makes a distinction between repressive migrations (deportations) and non-repressive migrations; granted, he considers them all as “forced migrations”. His classification of these movements is adopted below:

A.            Repressive migrations (deportations):

I. on social grounds: decossackization, dekulakization, expulsion of nobility

II. on ethnic grounds: “political preparation of the theatre of war”, total deportations of “punished peoples”, compensatory deportations, imposed “pale of settlement”

III. on confessional grounds – entire confessions/clerics from various confessions

IV. on political grounds – members of banned organizations and parties, people’s enemies’ family members, socially unsafe elements, treaty repatriates, foreign nationals

V. prisoners of war – POWs, civilian internees

VI. prisoners – political (prisoners of conscience), criminals

B.            Non-repressive (“voluntary-compulsory”) migrations:

VII. planned resettlements and resettlements “on call”, e.g. as an effect of military, industrial, power production-related and other types of construction work; demobilized army service members

VIII.  evacuees (re-evacuees), refugees, volunteer repatriates – displaced by war, as a result of genocide, ethnic or confessional conflicts, natural disasters and environmental catastrophes

Figure 1. Classification of forced migrations (after Polian 2004: 44-45)

It seems to be of importance that while the deportations of Latvians to other republics clearly belong to the categories A. IV. and A. VI., also – A. III. and A. V., the immigration of Russians and other Slavs to the Latvian SSR belongs to the category B. VII. Even if both movements were in fact forced, the psychological effects on the Latvians that stayed in Latvia are not difficult to surmise. Both the departure of their loved ones and the arrival of foreigners – as if in order to “take their place” – must have caused opposition and aversion.

When analysing Russian migration to non-Russian republics, Kolstoe (1994) summarizes three possible causes for this movement mentioned in the literature. What is interesting, the cases of the Baltic states, including Latvia, seem to provide counter-arguments for all three hypotheses:

1)         the socio-economic hypothesis (e.g. Lewis, Rowland & Clem 1976) ascribes migration to the universal processes of modernization. Russians were moving to undeveloped regions in order to urbanize and modernize them. This argument cannot apply to Latvia and Estonia, which, upon entering the USSR, were more modernized than many other Soviet republics. It may be claimed, however, that the two states, while possessing highly trained and well-educated staff, did not have sufficient numbers of manual labour force. For this reason, Russians moving there were usually poorly educated, which in turn reduced their capability of learning the local languages and interest in the local cultures;

2)           the ethno-political hypothesis (e.g. Titma & Tuma 1992) implies the existence of either a deliberate plan to eradicate ethnic identities of all Soviet citizens in order to create a denationalized Soviet everyman, or a covert but tenacious russification strategy. The fact that Russians arriving in Latvia and Estonia formed rather isolated communities counters the former; the experience of Lithuania, where the Communist Party consisted mostly of ethnic Lithuanians (e.g. in Latvia it consisted of only 29.2% ethnic Latvians[1]) and where “local authorities managed to impose a considerable limit on immigration”[2] counters the latter;

3)           the security hypothesis: large numbers of Russians and other Slavs were sent to those republics in which the titular nation was considered unreliable by the Kremlin. This argument seems to apply to Latvia and Estonia, but fails to explain why a considerably smaller number of Russians was sent to Ukraine and Lithuania, where the resistance towards Sovietisation was just as high[3].

In relation to the second hypothesis it may be noted that, as Kolstoe suggests, Lenin truly believed in the idea of a denationalized Soviet man, in the eradication of any national consciousness, Russian included[4]. What is more, he understood that it was impossible to build Soviet power in the provinces on the support of local Russians only, so the development of local languages and education of local Russians were encouraged by Moscow. But by the time the Baltic states entered the USSR, it was led by Stalin, who supported Russian as a lingua franca and the Russian nation’s role of the ‘big brother’.

There are more differences between Latvia (and Lithuania and Estonia) and other non-Russian republics. It has been mentioned that the peak of Russian immigration to the Baltics – and to other republics, in fact – occurred at the end of the 1940s. In most republics, Russian immigration no longer played a significant role in the 1960s and 1970s. But the Baltics continued to experience it: 708,000 persons arrived after 1959[5]. What is more, while Latvians and Estonians – and Russians in other republics – noted a negative birth rate, the positive birth rate of Baltic Russians was caused by the fact that the Russians migrating there were much younger and many of them reached the reproductive age at that time[6]. They also seemed to have better conditions for starting a family. While 79% of families whose members had all immigrated to Latvia from other republics – and 68% of those who had lived in Latvia for less than five years – already lived in individual flats, only 57% of Latvian families and single Latvians lived in individual flats[7].

After the Union collapsed, while for example in Central Asia state authorities have made strenuous attempts to persuade the Russians to stay, Latvian and Estonian authorities were anxious to have them evicted[8].

*part of the project “Discourse-historical analysis of the press discourse on ethnic conflict in Latvia” carried out at the Herder Institute in Marburg, Germany, in January-February 2013. For full bibliography, see here.

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[1] Ābols 2003: 245.

[2] Kolstoe 1995: 60.

[3] Kolstoe 1995: 53.

[4] Kolstoe 1995: 73.

[5] Bleiere et al. 2006: 418.

[6] Kolstoe 1995: 63-66.

[7] Bleiere et al. 2006: 421.

[8] Kolstoe 1995: 69.

Ethnic situation in Latvia after 1991

Latvia has always claimed its accession to the Soviet Union as illegal. Thus, after regaining independence in 1991, it announced itself to be the successor of the first Republic of Latvia proclaimed in 1918. All the three Baltic countries did not proclaim their independence as new states, but resurrected and reconfirmed their former statehood[1]. This took place in accordance with the fact that the incorporation of Baltic States by the USSR was generally not recognized internationally.

Latvia consequently restored its pre-war Constitution, but at the same time opted for a new Citizenship Law. There was an intensive debate on the issue, concluded with the decision to introduce quite an exclusive policy, according to which automatic citizenship was granted to all those who had had the Latvian citizenship before the Soviet occupation in June 1940 and their descendants. At least 27% of the Latvian population were disenfranchised[2]. This led many authors to claim that instead of a democracy, Latvia was becoming an ethnocracy[3]. The policy was not, however, based on the ethnic affiliation but rather blood descent, and it was a legal consequence of restoring the pre-war statehood and its citizenry. In fact, some 30,000 to 40,000 ethnic Latvians who were not citizens did not obtain citizenship, while a total of 278,087 ethnic Russians, or 38.5% of all Russians in Latvia, were granted automatic citizenship[4].

The argument of renewing pre-war policies loses its validity if we take into account that in August 1919, Latvian citizenship was granted to all persons living permanently on Latvian territory before World War I[5] (inclusive citizenship policy). During the first Republic of Latvia, however, the conditions in terms of minority populations were very different. The minorities were not only smaller in number, but also much better integrated and loyal to the new state. Even though the territory of the present-day Republic of Latvia had always been inhabited by various ethnic groups – not only Latvians, but also a Finno-Ugric people – the Livs, Germans (starting in the 13th century), Jews and Poles (16th century), Belarusians and Russian old-believers (17th century) and orthodox Russians (18th century), the first Republic of Latvia, proclaimed on November 18, 1918, was clearly a nation-based state with Latvians constituting absolute majority (72.76%) and a Russian minority amounting to less than 10% of the population[6].

During – and as a result of – World War II, dramatic ethnographic changes took place. On June 16, 1940, the USSR issued an ultimatum to Latvia demanding entry of army units and removal of the authoritarian government. The ultimatum was accepted on the same day, starting the period of the first Soviet occupation of Latvia. But the “exodus of the Baltic Germans” had begun even earlier, in 1939. By spring 1940, “about 51,000 Germans left Latvia, mostly in German ships”; ca. 10,000 Germans remained. The second wave of German emigration took place in the first months of 1940, “and only about 1,500 Baltic Germans remained in Latvia”[7].

On July 21, the “People’s Parliament” elected in mock elections featuring a single list of candidates was established, and its first act was to adopt an illegal declaration of accepting annexation and incorporation by the USSR[8]. A common feature of this “annexation and incorporation” of various nation states by the USSR in 1940-1941 was the operation of mass deportations. In June 1941, such an operation was launched in Western Ukraine, Moldavia, Estonia, Latvia (15,000 deportees), Lithuania and Western Belarus. The deportations were aimed at “anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous elements (…), members of various nationalistic parties, police members, gendarmes, land proprietors, industrialists, high officials, officers and criminals involved in anti-Soviet activities and employed by foreign intelligence services for spying”[9].

16,940 males and 25,193 females were deported in another action of March 25-29, 1949[10].

With most Germans and many Latvians gone – and with the Jewish and Roma populations eradicated almost completely – the Russian migration into Latvia (as into all other annexed countries) began, “and soon attained considerable proportions. About 400,000 Russians and 100,000 other immigrants arrived in Latvia between 1945 and 1959. The peak period is believed to be 1947-9”[11].

World War II had a catastrophic effect on the ethnography of Latvia. The repatriation of Germans and exterminations of Jews eradicated the two ethnic groups that had played an important role in Latvia’s economy and culture before the war. Due to war casualties, repressions and migrations, the number of ethnic Latvians could have dropped by 267,000 persons[12]; but the absolute population of Latvia increased due to the above-mentioned Russian immigration. It must also be highlighted that World War II, due to the massive loss of Latvian men at reproductive age, not only resulted in immediate decrease in the number of ethnic Latvians, but also affected their natural growth in following decades.

The following table summarizes the changes in population of various ethnic groups in Latvia between 1920 and 2000:

Table 1

	Latvians	Russians	Belarusians	Ukrainians	Jews	Germans
1920	72.76%	7.82%	4.74%	-	4.99%	3.64%
1935	75.50%	10.59%	1.38%	0.10%	4.79%	3.19%
1943	81.90%	9.50%	2.70%	0.60%	-	-
1959	62.00%	26.50%	2.90%	1.40%	1.70%	-
1970	56.70%	29.80%	4.00%	2.20%	1.50%	-
1979	53.70%	32.90%	4.40%	2.60%	1.10%	-
1989	52.04%	33.90%	4.40%	3.40%	0.80%	-
1996	56.50%	30.40%	4.40%	2.80%	0.60%	0.20%
2000	57.58%	29.61%	4.10%	2.68%	0.44%	0.15%

Worth noting are especially the following changes:

- drastic decrease of the number of Latvians between 1943 and 1959, due to war casualties,deportations and Russian immigration;

-  drastic increase of the number of Russians between 1943 and 1959;

- the decrease in Belarusian population between 1920 and 1935 (many Belarusians stated Russian or Polish identity in the 1935 census[13]), and the increase between 1959 and 1970 due to immigration;

- drastic decrease of the number of Jews and Germans after 1943; let us be reminded that Jewish and German historical minorities were well integrated, well educated and played an important role in building the first Latvian state.

Jubulis[14] summarizes the population changes in Latvia and Riga between 1935 and 1989 in absolute numbers:

         1935-1989:                            LATVIA         RĪGA

         Latvians                                  -79,278        +89,203

         Russians                                  +737,249    +402,209

         Belarusians                            +92,899      +42,858

         Ukrainians                             +90,257       +38,955

         Jews                                         -70,473        -24,860

         Germans                                 -58,333        -37,469

         total (includes ‘others’)        +761,194    +525,392

The next table shows the change in proportion of ethnic Latvians in the biggest Latvian cities; the last column presents the proportion of Russian speakers in the respective cities after 1989:

Table 2

	after: Etnosituācija Latvijā 1992: 4					after: Jubulis 2001: 159
	1935	1959	1970	1979	1989	Russian speakers in 1989
Rīga Daugavpils Liepāja Jelgava Jūrmala Ventspils Rēzekne Jēkabpils Valmiera Ogre	63.0% 33.6% 68.0% 78.9% 86.6% 83.5% 44.0% 65.8% 95.0% 83.4%	44.6% 13.2% 52.3% 59.7% 50.7% 60.4% 30.5% 50.4% 79.6% 60.0%	40.9% 14.4% 47.5% 56.4% 46.8% 55.0% 34.7% 50.4% 75.2% 63.1%	38.3% 12.6% 41.9% 52.1% 48.2% 47.5% 35.0% 50.0% 74.0% 61.4%	36.5% 13.0% 38.8% 49.7% 44.2% 43.0% 37.3% 48.4% 74.6% 60.7%	56.9% 70.5% 55.5% 44.6% 50.4% 51.6% 58.6% 45.7% no data no data

Sovietisation and Russification affected especially the ethnic minorities: in 1989 only 22.5% Jews, 27.1% Poles, 32.2% Belarusians, 34% Germans, 45.9% Ukrainians, 50.3% Estonians and 63.9% Lithuanians living in Latvia knew their nation’s mother tongue, and only 22.8% Poles, 27% Jews, 28.7% Estonians and 40.3% Lithuanians could communicate also in Latvian[15]. The fact that most non-Russian ethnic minorities in the Latvian SSR assumed a de-nationalized Soviet identity with Russian as a lingua franca has led to the creation of a two-community society in the newly restored Latvia.

A huge Russian (or Russian-speaking) minority today is not a problem limited to Latvia or even the Baltic states. 21 million Russians were residing in the fourteen non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union in the 1970s (at the end of the 20th century the Russian Diaspora in post-Soviet countries amounted to 25 million people[16]). Russian immigration embraced all republics to varying degrees, which has led the successor state of the Soviet Union – the Russian Federation – to assume the role of an “external homeland” and protector of Russians (understood as citizens of Russia, ethnic Russians, or even simply Russian-speakers) in the “near abroad” – non-Russian post-Soviet states – perceived as one of the most important directions in Russian foreign politics.

The developments outlined above have resulted in the creation of a triadic relationship between the national (ethnic[17]) minority, the (nationalizing) state in which it lives, and the external homeland[18]. There are many factors that affect this relationship, which as it is appears complicated enough. First, all three stakeholders experienced a major change of status in the 1990s, resulting in a crisis of identity: the nationalizing state of Latvia and Latvians are in the process of “healing” their national identity[19], the external homeland of Russia is reconstructing its own identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the minority of ethnic Russians and ca. 100 other post-Soviet nationalities[20] – among which a true, de-nationalized Soviet citizen (“Homo Sovieticus”) may undoubtedly still be found – is trapped in the middle, not yet Latvian, but not really Russian either[21]. Second, the Latvian state positions itself as a protector of Latvian national values, incl. the Latvian language, which may be seen as taking precedence over the rights of minorities. Third, the external homeland claims the right to protect its Diaspora (however broadly defined) and, by extension, to interfere in internal matters of the new state. But actually it is not so much interested in bringing its “compatriots” back home or having them fully integrated in the new country, as both outcomes would make its “right” to interfere lose ground. In such a context, the minority group may act in choosing between available strategies – exit, voice, loyalty (according to Jubulis 2001) or informal networks, exit, voice (according to Commercio 2010). As a matter of fact, the Russian-speaking group in Latvia appears rather passive, which may be considered a legacy of Communist (lack of) political culture reinforced by the undertakings of both the nationalizing state and the external homeland. The dominant discourse of the former may have been internalized by representatives of the minorities by now, making them believe that their identities are ‘problematic’ and that it is fair they have fewer rights[22]. The discourse of the latter, as well as of local leaders positioning themselves as defenders of non-citizens’ rights, may have resulted in an average non-citizen waiting for laws to change rather than taking an individual effort of applying for citizenship or learning Latvian[23].

*part of the project “Discourse-historical analysis of the press discourse on ethnic conflict in Latvia” carried out at the Herder Institute in Marburg, Germany, in January-February 2013. For full bibliography, see here.

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[1] Kolstoe 1995: 111.

[2] Kuklys 2008: 52.

[3] “Ethnocentric nation-building” (Kolstoe 2000: 116); “ethnic democracy with an exclusion policy” (Linz & Stephan 1996: 429ff). See also e.g. Smith, Aasland & Mole 1996, Pabriks 1999.

[4] Jubulis 2001: 25.

[5] Dribins 2001: 311.

[6] Dribins (ed.) 1996: 6, 12. As a side note, it may be mentioned that in 1992, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumière, argued that Latvia’s position (i.e., the exclusive citizenship law) “was understandable since the Russian minority did not fit the ‘traditional’ concept of a national minority”, as it was above 10% (Galbreath 2005: 277).

[7] Bleiere et al. 2006: 218.

[8] Blūzma, Jundzis, Riekstiņš et al. 2009.

[9] Polian 2004: 120.

[10] Ābols 2003: 232-233.

[11] Kolstoe 1995: 47.

[12] Bleiere et al. 2006: 418.

[13] Dribins 2001: 308.

[14] Jubulis 2001: 47-48.

[15] Dribins 2001: 318.

[16] Jubulis 2001.

[17] As M. Lindqvist claims, “national identity is transformed, semantically, into an ethnic identity when the bearer moves from a dominant position to that of a minority, that is, from his or her “own” land to a “foreign” one” (2003: 8).

[18] Galbreath 2005: 29.

[19] Silova 2006: 86.

[20] Commercio 2010: 30.

[21] Cf. B. Lindqvist 2003: 333.

[22] Cf. Gelber 2002: 84 – theory originally developed with regard to racist hate speech-acts, and Gould 2010: “minorities (…) internalise the stereotypes and prejudices employed in connection with their own groups; they also internalise an image of themselves as problematic; that is to say, as foreign or as the cause of social problems and a threat to social cohesion” (p. 17).

[23] Apine & Volkovs 2007: 90.